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ABSTRACT 
 
Democratic elections are one of the most important social phenomena of the last 
centuries. Countries which publish elections results on the polling station level 
provide a valuable source of data for different groups of scientists like geographers 
and statisticians. In this work, we combined geographical and statistical analysis, 
pursuing a goal of defining the spatial patterns and irregularities of the electoral 
data. From theoretical point of view, it will help to find out if the electoral behavior 
has any spatial dependency. From practical perspective, it can give a new insight 
about the electoral fraud detection. We have applied a set of statistical methods to 
estimate the distribution and variability of the electoral behavior in space and time 
for different geographic units. Canada was selected as a study area because it is an 
old democracy where the elections are considered being fair, and all the necessary 
data are available. 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
  Democratic elections are one of the most important social phenomena of 
the last centuries. Since voting process requires personal presence of each voter 
and must be completed in a strictly limited period of time, there should be a great 
number of polling stations. The electoral agencies aggregate voting results from the 
stations to get final results, i.e. selected party standings in the Parliament. In some 
countries they publish data at polling station level, while in others they present only 
intermediate aggregation results. In any way, these are the valuable sources of data 
for different groups of scientists like geographers and statisticians. 
 One of the main research directions in the electoral science is the contextual 
study. Geographers and statisticians are trying to relate a certain voting behavior to 
socio-economic context of the particular geographic areas. This context can be very 
different, from the ethnicity to the level of income. Examples include, but are not 
limited to: 
 Impact of Negro migration on the electoral geography of Michigan (P. Lewis, 
1965) 
 The electoral geography of recession: local economic conditions, public 
perceptions and the economic vote in the 1992 British general election (Pattie et al, 
1997) 
 Protestant support for the Nazi Party in Germany (J. O'Loughlin, 2002) 
 The territorial variable in the analysis of electoral behavior in Spain (A. de 
Nieves and M. Docampo, 2013). 
 In general, the papers confirm a strong influence of the socio-economic 
context on the electoral behavior. For instance, in the last of the abovementioned 
papers the authors classify the territory of Spain into habitats by land use type: city, 
periphery, small urban, deactivated rural, agrarian rural and manualized rural. Then, 
they argue that each habitat has its own electoral portrait: “peripheries are the 
habitat that is more clearly oriented towards left-wing politics”, “...cities are clearly 
characterized for their electoral support to green parties”, “deactivated rural ... is 
certainly one of the habitats with highest percentages of electoral support to right-
wing parties” (A. de Nieves and M. Docampo, 2013) and so on. 
 Moreover, the local context has a synergetic effect because the local 
majority affects the local minority: “people tend to vote in a certain direction based 
upon the relational effects of the people living in the neighborhood” (Cox, 1969). To 
describe this phenomenon, K. Cox introduced the term “neighborhood effect”. His 
approach was actively developed by a group of British researchers, mainly R. 
Johnson, C. Pattie and W. Miller. Their findings “provided a very strong 
circumstantial evidence of neighborhood effects, local polarization produced 
through social interaction in which the area’s majority political opinions is 
accentuated through processes of ‘conversion through conversation’” (Johnson et 
al, 2000). 
 Going further, we could expect that neighborhoods tend to share similarity 
between each other. As so-called Waldo Tobler's first law of geography says, 
“everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than 
distant things” (Tobler, 1970). This concept was developed for socio-economic data 
by L. Anselin in “Spatial Econometrics: Methods and models” (Anselin, 1988). We 
could expect that if the independent socio-economic variables are spatially 
determined, dependent variables like voting behavior could inherit such kind of 
distribution. Also, some people move between the neighborhoods, so the process 
of ‘conversion through conversation’ could work not only internally but externally 
as well. It raises a relevant question about the spatial determinance of the voting 
behavior. 
 Besides completely theoretical conclusions, research of the spatial 
determinance of the voting behavior could give a new insight about the electoral 
fraud detection. All of the existing methods are based on the assumption that i f the 
electoral data is manipulated, statistical analysis might reflect the interference by 
disclosing certain anomalies. For example, application of Benford’s Law to polling 
returns (Mebane, 2009, Deckert et al., 2009) and last digit testing (Beber and 
Scacco, 2008) refer to the stability in distribution of the digits in real datasets . If the 
distribution is different, it is the evidence of manipulation. These methods are not 
very sensitive, and they were proven as non-effective for the electoral data by 
Deckert, Myagkov and Ordeshook: “Deviations from either the first or second digit 
version of that law [Benford’s Law] can arise regardless of whether an election is 
free and fair. In fact, fraud can move data in the direction of satisfying that law and 
thereby occasion wholly erroneous conclusions.” (Deckert et al, 2009). Another 
method, a more important one, is voter turnout and party share regression 
(Myagkov et al, 2009, Mebane and Kalinin, 2009, Klimek et al, 2012, Sonin, 2012). 
Researchers state that there is no or a very week correlation between the voter 
turnout and the winner party share in old democracies where the elections are 
considered being fair, while in developing democracies like Russia and Uganda such 
correlation can be observed clearly. Summarizing, we have to stress that none of 
the abovementioned methods deal with geographic data.  
 Nevertheless, we could find some papers dealing with the geographical 
context of the electoral fraud. We could mention the work Skye S. Christensen, who 
tried to explain the level of fraud in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and Sierra-Leone by 
linking the modeled levels of the electoral fraud with population density, natural 
resources distribution and security events (Christensen, 2011). Although some 
valuable conclusions were made, the analysis was done on a very large scale 
(second-order administrative division) and it could not provide a detailed picture. 
Another remarkable paper dedicated to detecting the electoral fraud was written by 
J. Chen. He analyzed the distribution of the financial aid after 2004 Florida hurricane 
by Bush administration and its impact on the changes in turnout and vote shares on 
the electoral district level (Chen, 2008). Finally, he stated that Bush administration 
had concentrated the aid on core Republican districts, increasing the voter turnout 
and the Republican share, and claimed that votes were bought by using public 
funds. Anyway, the mentioned studies are contextual (i.e. population vs. fraud, aid 
vs. voting), and the question of detecting the fraud by analyzing the spatial patterns 
of the electoral data is still open. Logically, it could be expected that if there is some 
spatial regularity in the voting patterns, spatial irregularities could point on the 
fraud. 
 Working on geographical analysis of the electoral data, we have to consider 
one of the fundamental problems of spatial statistics: so-called Modifiable Areal 
Unit Problem (MAUP). Per ESRI GIS dictionary, it is “a challenge that occurs during 
the spatial analysis of aggregated data in which the results differ when the same 
analysis is applied to the same data, but different aggregation schemes are used. 
For example, analysis using data aggregated by county will differ from analysis using 
data aggregated by census tract.” This issue was described by S. Openshaw, 1983, 
who stated that “the areal units (zonal objects) used in many geographical studies 
are arbitrary, modifiable, and subject to the whims and fancies of whoever is doing, 
or did, the aggregating.” An example of such statistical bias can be seen on Figure 1 
below. It is clear that grouping of the observations in different ways can give 
absolutely different results: 
   
Figure 1. Modifiable Aerial Unit Problem. 
Of course, given a set of polling divisions we can do nothing to change the division 
schema, but this is a problem not only in case of transforming the point data to the 
polygonal data. Also, when we group the polygons in one or another manner at 
higher levels of aggregation, we can get different results . An explaining example can 
be seen below: 
 
  
Figure 2. Aggregation problem. 
When we group all the demonstrated observations into a single group there is a 
strong correlation pattern, but when we break them into two groups the result 
changes dramatically. Most of the researchers analyze the elections results at the 
level of the entire country or at the first level of administrative divisions (i.e. 
Canadian provinces). Meanwhile, aggregation of the data at the level of the 
administrative districts or cities could give unexpected results. Thus, we strongly 
believe all methods that are related to geographic data have to be tested at 
different aggregation levels. 
1.2 Objectives  
 While the old democracies have made a substantial progress in developing 
free, fair and transparent election process which results are considered to be 
legitimate in most cases, the electoral outcomes in some of the young democracies 
are often quite questionable. For establishing any method of the electoral fraud 
detection, countries from the first category should be compared with ones from the 
second. We suggest that the initial step in this direction is to analyze the first 
category. Canada is a good example of such country, and we can easily access all the 
necessary data on polling division level (both tabular and geographic). This is why 
Canada is selected as the study area. 
 The main goal of the thesis is to investigate patterns and irregularities of 
Canadian electoral data at different geographic scales. 
1.3 Assumptions 
 There is a set of assumptions regarding different parts of the research: 
 Elections results are spatially determined; 
 Electoral data has certain statistical and spatial characteristics , deviations 
from which would let the researcher expect the data manipulation; 
1.4 General Methodology 
 Taking into account the pursued goal, we decided to use the following 
methods: 
 Estimate the variability and distribution of the main variables by getting 
ranges, interquartile ranges, etc. and building plots and histograms,  
 Evaluate the bivariate distribution of the voter turnout and party shares by 
building density scatterplots, convex hulls, etc.; 
 Explore correlation between the voter turnout and party shares by getting 
correlation coefficients; 
 Define spatial autocorrelation for the main variables by calculating Moran’s 
Index; 
 Perform cluster and outlier analysis by calculating Local Moran’s Index for 
the main variables; 
 Work on multivariate analysis of the data by using hierarchical clustering 
algorithms and estimating spatial distribution of the classes; 
 Perform simulation studies to model the electoral fraud and repeat the 
abovementioned methods to estimate how the interference is reflected in the 
results. 
1.5 Dissertation Organization 
 The thesis is organized accordingly to the selected methodology. In the 
second chapter, we described the data and methods of data access. The third 
chapter is dedicated to the exploratory analysis: distribution, variability and 
correlation analysis. The chapter ends with a simulation study where we modelled a 
real-life situation of the electoral fraud and discussed how the exploratory analysis 
reveals the data manipulation. The fourth chapter is related to the spatial analysis. 
It is dealing with spatial autocorrelation and multivariate spatial analysis , and also 
ends with a simulation study. There is one annex which contains an example of a 
function written in R. Complete set of code and graphs set can be found in a digital 
attachment (DVD), along with a PostgreSQL database backup. 
 
  
2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
2.1 How are the elections organized 
 Since the electoral data describes a real-world process of elections, before 
making any research it is necessary to understand how are the elections organized. 
Representation in the Canadian House of Commons is based on electoral 
districts, also known as constituencies or ridings (“electoral districts” further). Each 
electoral district elects one member to the House of Commons, and the number of 
electoral districts is established through a formula set out in the Constitution. Their 
boundaries are designed in a way that they contain similar amounts of people. This 
is done to represent of people’s political preferences in the government in an equal 
way. 
In 2011, there were 308 electoral districts in Canada. Their boundaries can 
be seen of Figure 3, within Canadian provinces: 
 
Figure 3. Electoral districts (Canada, 2011). 
 
Some of the provinces, like Northwest Territories, include just one electoral district 
due to their low population, while heavily inhabited provinces, like Quebec, contain 
many of them. Each electoral district is divided into a set of polling divisions, again 
in accordance with the amount of population. Polling divisions can be seen on 
Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4. Electoral districts and polling divisions (Canada, 2011). 
 
Each polling division has a certain number of citizens that live within its area 
and are eligible to vote, being older than 18. In most cases, this number is between 
200 and 600: 
                           2006   2008                    2011 
 
Figure 5. Number of voters in polling divisions of Canada. 
 
In Canada, there is no obligatory participation in any kind of elections, so 
some of these people participate and some do not. Thus, the number of possible 
and actual voters on each station is different. Ratio between these two numbers is 
called voter turnout and is represented as a percentage between 0 (no actual 
electors) and 100 (when everybody participated). Each electoral district has its own 
set of candidates. People vote for different candidates which are associated with 
their political parties. About 20 parties have participated in General elections in 
2010. Among these parties, there are three main parties: Conservative, New 
Democratic and Liberal, which were represented by their candidates in all ridings. 
Also there is one strong regional party: Bloc Québécois, which is represented in 
French-speaking province Quebec. All the rest parties are minor parties represented 
in a small number of federal districts, except Green Party which had 304 candidates 
but was elected only in one electoral district. 
The winning candidate has more votes within the electoral district than any 
other candidate. This is called “first-past-the-post” election, or “winner-takes-all”, 
or “simple plurality”. Party who gained majority of the chairs in the Parliament is 
called “Government”, the second is the “Official Opposition”, and there are “Third”, 
“Fourth” and “Fifth” parties. The Government was formed by Conservatives from 
2006 to 2011, while Liberal party was the Official opposition in 2006 and 2008, 
replaced by New Democratic party in 2011. In that year, Liberal party became the 
third party, replacing Bloc Quebecois which was there in 2006 and 2008. 
2.2 Elections results data 
Elections Canada is an organization responsible for conducting the federal 
elections. All data related to elections is available on their website. Election results 
are published for each polling division since 2000. At the same time, the 
representation format was changed throughout the years. For example, in 2004 we 
can find only the vote count for each candidate called by name (without related 
political party), which makes the analysis of party support impossible. This format is 
called "pollbypoll", and its structure is described in Table 1 (Annex 1). Since 2006, 
Elections Canada published CSV files with political affiliation of candidates included. 
The new format is called "pollresults". Its structure is described in Table 2 (Annex 2). 
Since 2006, data is published as two sets of CSV files, one per each electoral district 
in both formats. It was decided to use only “pollresults” tables because they contain 
all the necessary information. Tables for each election were created in PostgreSQL 
database, and a Python script was written to generate valid SQL scripts for data 
import. The script retrieved all file names in the folder and pasted them into COPY 
statements. All the data was imported to text columns. This is a default setting in 
PostgreSQL to avoid misinterpretations and errors during the import, importing 
data “as is”. 
The next step was to get data into a format appropriate for the analysis and 
visualization. Only 5 parties won at least in 1 electoral district, so it was decided to 
summarize the data only for these parties, showing the total result of the rest 
parties in a single column. The structure of the summarized data can be found in 
Table 4 (Annex 1). The obtained structure described is more understandable and 
more suitable for the analysis, since the vote count is assigned to political parties 
and not to the individual politicians which are different for each electoral district. It 
contains both absolute (vote count) and relative (percentage) values. This table is 
the final attribute table holding the election results which will be used for the future 
analysis. 
2.3 Geographic features 
Geographic locations of the polling stations and/or polling divisions are 
necessary to perform spatial analysis of the electoral data. Since we have the 
necessary electoral data for 2006, 2008 and 2011 elections, we have to get related 
geographic information for these years. Electoral district and polling division 
boundaries for General Elections are available for downloading at the website of 
Elections Canada. They are represented by polygon datasets in common geospatial 
formats. The attribute structure of polling  division data is described in Table 6 of 
Annex 1. 
Since the electoral district number is assigned to each polling division, there 
is no need to operate with electoral district geometries during the analysis. We 
already have the necessary identifier in the table. Electoral district geometries will 
be used just for mapping purposes. For analysis, only polling division geometries will 
be used.  
In addition, there are datasets containing point locations of mobile polling 
stations and single-building electoral divisions like hospitals, etc. 
All the described shapefiles for 2006, 2008 and 2011 elections were 
imported into PostGIS-enabled PostgreSQL database with “PostGIS 2.0 Shapefile 
and DBF Loader Exporter” and named by using the following naming convention: 
“country code”_”year”.”dataset abbreviation”. Thus, the tables were named like 
this: “ca_2011.ed” (electoral districts), “ca_2011.pd” (polling divisions) and 
“ca_2011.ps” (polling stations). Each combination of the country code and the year 
represents a database schema in this case. This is done for convenience, avoiding 
confusingly large number of tables in a single database schema. 
In the electoral districts dataset, some districts were represented by several 
polygons, and these polygons were joined by SQL script. To enable the analysis 
which requires point geometries instead of polygonal, we derived point geometries 
from polygons and placed them in separate column. For doing this, we utilized 
PostGIS function ST_Pointonsurface instead of ST_Centroid, since it creates point 
that lies inside polygon even if it has a concave shape (see Figure ): 
                                         ST_Centroid        ST_Pointonsurface 
 
Figure 6. ST_Centroid and ST_PointOnSurface functions in PostGIS. 
 
One of the concerns about the electoral districts is that their boundaries 
might not match the administrative ones. If not, it can be useful to perform the 
analysis in administrative division context as well. To do this, we should find the 
relationship between electoral and administrative division of Canada. So, what is 
the administrative structure of Canada? 
The first level of Canadian administrative division is Provinces and 
Territories, and there are 13 of them. As already demonstrated on Figure 1 above, 
boundaries of the electoral districts perfectly match with provincial boundaries, and 
it is clear which province the electoral district belongs to.  
The second level of Canadian administrative division is administrative district 
level. There are 293 administrative districts in Canada. This number is quite close to 
the number of the electoral districts (308). When overlaid, electoral district 
boundaries look quite arbitrary (see Figure 4 below). The administrative boundaries 
are likely to be less artificial than electoral boundaries because the first ones take 
into account the historical and geographic differences, while the second ones are 
designed to contain approximately the same amount of population. This is why the 
electoral behavior analysis in the administrative context could give us different 
results. 
 
Figure 7. Administrative and electoral districts (Canada, 2011). 
  
The third level is the municipal level. At this level, there are 5589 territory 
units. Municipal division is again quite different from electoral division, as can be 
seen on Figure 5. Municipalities vary in population greatly, the urban ones contain 
much more polling divisions than the rural ones. For example, on the insert in 
Figure 5 you can see municipality of Saskatoon city which partly intersects with 4 
federal districts: #47002, #47009, #47010 and #47011 (thicker grey boundaries) and 
contains 411 polling divisions (thin light grey boundaries). Aggregation the polling 
data on the city level could give us an insight about how different is the electoral 
behavior within the cities. Analysis on the electoral districts level could not provide 
such information because they are not tied to specific cities. 
 
Figure 8. Urban municipalities and polling divisions (Canada, 2011). 
 
 
We related polling divisions to each of the administrative units and stored these 
relations in a table for improving performance of spatial operations (it is faster to 
get precalculated relationships than performing spatial joins each time). The 
structure of the table is described in Table 7 (Annex 1). 
2.4 Data access 
Since we have very similar datasets for several years of elections and keep 
the geographic relationships in a single table, the code to query this data will look 
the same for all cases, with a couple of parameters. In this case, an efficient solution 
is a stored procedure (in PostgreSQL terminology they are called functions). The 
created functions will take the following parameters: 
 level (integer) – specifies the aggregation level (see in the Table above) 
 unit (varchar(150), default null) – territory unit filter. If not specified, returns 
all observations within the aggregation level 
For example, getting all observations for Ontario province in 2011 is as easy 
as executing this line of code: 
select * from ca_2011.getdata(1,"Ontario"); 
Another stored procedure was created to get the same data as the previous 
one does, and polling division geometries in addition: 
select * from ca_2011.getgeodata(1,"Ontario"); 
This is very important because managing the SQL code in stored procedures 
helps to avoid incorrect code and SQL-related errors when programming in R. 
Short summary of the data description looks like this: 
 The main investigated variables are: 
o Voter turnout 
o Conservative party share 
o Liberal party share 
o New Democratic party share 
o Bloc Quebecois share (only for Quebec province); 
 Each polling division is an observation consisting of ID and a vector of 
variables; 
 Each electoral district and Canadian province, administrative district, city 
and neighborhood is a territory unit; 
 A set of territory units is an aggregation level. If we analyze the distribution 
of some variable at province level, it means that we describe this distribution for 13 
sets of observations (1 for each province). 
 All data is imported to a PostgreSQL database and the access to this data is 
enabled by the stored procedures (PostgreSQL functions). 
 
3  EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS 
 Investigating patterns and irregularities, it is very important to start by 
doing the exploratory analysis. The character of distribution and variability of the 
main variables is a key information in this case. A set of exploratory procedures 
should be done at all aggregation levels. First we are going to estimate global 
distribution of the variables (then the population is the entire country’s data). Then, 
we will look closer to the local distributions (distributions for different territories 
smaller than the country). The next thing to look at will be the ranges and standard 
deviations for our variables at different aggregation levels, and in the last 
subchapter we will work on correlation analysis. 
3.1  Distribution and variability 
 
Starting with distribution, it is important to understand how many 
observations does each territory unit contain. These amounts can be very different:  
             Electoral districts  Administrative districts     Urban municipalities 
 
Figure 9. Number of polling division inside territory units  
at different aggregation levels (Canada, all  years). 
 Electoral districts have the distribution close to normal, while administrative 
boundaries demonstrate the exponential growth in the amount of observations. 
Thus, any obtained indicators should be checked for positive correlation with the 
number of observations, because higher variation might be just the consequence of 
a larger number of the observations inside the units. Literally, more polling divisions 
are located within the unit, more different values we observe. On the other hand, a 
weaker dependency indicates meaningful results.  
 Distribution of the main variables for the entire Canada (except Bloc 
Quebecois which participated only in Quebec) can be observed on the histogram 
matrix on Figure 10. Solid red line is the normal distribution curve, while dashed red 
line reflects the modelled exponential distribution curve. 
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Figure 10. Global distribution of the main variables. 
  
These histograms let us draw the following conclusions: 
 Voter turnout demonstrates very evident normal distribution with most 
observations between 40 and 70% for all three years (a bit higher in 2006 but still 
close to 2008 and 2011). It means that the level of participation in parliamentary 
elections seems to be stable, regardless of changes in people’s political preferences; 
 There are no polling divisions with zero participation, i.e. having turnout 
value equal to 0%; and there is only a tiny fraction with complete participation, 
having turnout value >90%; 
 2011 was the most successful year for Conservative party. Its  share had 
distribution close to normal in 2006 and since then it started to change its nature to 
bimodal with the main peak at 40-60%. Still, without a peak at lower values the 
distribution looks close to a normal one; 
 Liberal party support was slowly decreasing from 2006 to 2011, and the 
distribution was changing from normal-like to a exponential-like during these years; 
 New Democratic party (NDP) share has changed its distribution from 
exponential to having a plain top between 20 and 50%. Indeed, 2011 elections were 
the most successful for NDP, they became an Official Opposition in that year; 
 Bloc Quebecois had a strong support in Quebec in 2006 and 2008, but in 
2011 their support has decreased dramatically (probably, in favor to NDP). At the 
same time, the distribution was close to normal in all years; 
 Parties with weaker support tend to have exponential distribution, while 
parties with stronger support usually demonstrate distribution close to normal. 
 All the variables demonstrate the stability of change, gradually moving 
towards a one direction through time (3 years might not enough to make such 
conclusions). 
Though we have made a set of important conclusions, these histograms 
provide just a general picture of voting patterns. They indicate the “global” 
distribution for the entire country, while there are many local distributions in 
different geographic regions that can be very different from each other. As a rough 
example, a bipolar “global” distribution can be a result of two normal local 
distributions. So, we have to analyze the local patterns. 
To estimate local distributions, we need to compute the number of samples, 
min, max, range, mean and standard deviation for each variable in each territory 
unit at all aggregation levels. If we presented each local distribution on a separate 
histogram, it would be hard to compare them, since we will have hundreds of them. 
Instead, we decided to create the representation which would have all local 
distributions as semitransparent histograms drawn on the same canvas . Each 
histogram’s opacity was derived from the total number of histograms. For example, 
if we plot some variable at the electoral district level (n=308), the opacity will be 2 
out of 255. Such overlay indicates both when many histograms share the same area 
and when there is an uncommon distribution nature. This was done for real data 
(the left column) and for normal and uniform simulations on the basis of that data 
(columns 2 and 3). To simulate normal distribution, we got the number of 
observations, mean and standard deviation from the real data and create variable 
vector in the basis of these values. To simulate random distribution, we created 
random vectors for each unit, taking the number of samples and the minimum and 
maximum value of the variable. Also, we have added a histogram of p-values from 
Shapiro-Wilk test for each territory unit (the right column). When p-value is less 
than 0.05 it means that with 95% chance the distribution is normal. 
The procedure described above was done for each of the main variables at 
the level of provinces, administrative districts, urban municipalities and electoral 
districts for each year. An example of Conservative party share in 2011 can be seen 
below: 
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Figure 11. Local distributions of Conservative party share 
at main aggregation levels (Canada, 2011). 
  
 
The graphs tell us the following: 
 Regardless of how does the global distribution look (normal, exponential, 
bimodal, etc.) and regardless of how does it change through time, local distribution 
histograms for real data look very similar to normal simulation histograms. On the 
contrary, random simulation looks different; 
 Shapiro-Wilk tests confirm normality of most of the local distributions, but at 
the same time there are many p-values higher than 0.05. For example, for 
Conservative party in 2011 they are 100 out of 306. At urban municipality level it is 
even more (86 out of 128), and this is related to more complicated political 
landscape in the cities; 
 There is no difference in the normality of distribution for all variables. Voter 
turnout and any of the party shares have the same pattern of distribution: around 
2/3 of the local distributions is normal and 1/3 is not normal, and vise versa for 
urban municipalities; 
 Higher p-values for different variables are usually represented in different 
territory units, i.e. there is a very small number of units which have p-values >0.05 
for all variables. 
 Conclusions confirm the assumption that the analysis of local patterns can 
give a lot of additional information to the global distribution analysis. 
 The next step is to analyze variability of the main variables at different 
aggregation levels. The most basic indicator of variability is the range which the 
difference between maximum and minimum values. Interquartile range (IQR), 
which is the range between the upper and lower quartiles (50% of values which lie 
around the mean), can give more meaningful information. As we already 
mentioned, it is very important to look at the significance of results by checking for 
a correlation between the variability indicator and the number of observations in 
each territory unit. In this case, scatterplots are the right method. Finally, 12 groups 
of graphs were produced (4 variables * 3 years). They are available in Annex II. Here 
we can see an example of one group for Conservative party share in 2011: 
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Figure 12. Simple and interquartile ranges for Conservative party share 
at main aggregation levels (Canada, 2011). 
We decided to build graphs only for these aggregation levels since at province level 
variability is too high and not meaningful. From the entire set of graphs for all years, 
the observations are the following: 
 Natural variability of the main variables is higher than expected. Units with 
simple range <10% and IQR <5% for any variable are extremely rare; 
 For three aggregations levels, histograms look differently. There is a very 
weak or no correlation between variability indicators and the number of 
observations for administrative and electoral districts, while for urban 
municipalities it is very strong. Polling divisions belonging to heavily populated 
districts can have both similar and different results. Larger cities have more 
differentiated electoral behavior if their inhabitants, since they usually have more 
social and economic contrast than the small ones. So, it was decided to exclude 
urban municipalities from the variability analysis . Large cities could be analyzed as 
the sets of neighborhoods, which is out of scope of this work; 
 Voter turnout range varies from 20 to 80%, with peak at 35-50%, and its IQR 
varies from 5 to 15% (with is a couple of exceptions).  
 Simple range for all parties can be very different, from 20 to 80%, while IQR 
mostly falls into the interval between 5 and 15% (generally, between 0 and 20%), 
with a couple of exceptions. It means that the electoral districts include the groups 
of polling divisions sharing the same behavior. These groups were not revealed by 
the simple range, while IQR helps to indicate them; 
 Variability indicators of Conservative party and especially New Democratic 
party share increase from 2006 to 2011, with the overall growth of these parties’ 
support. On the other hand, variability of Liberal party share decreases from 2006 
to 2011, while its share had been decreasing. This tendency is reflected especially in 
IQR histograms. Probably, the larger is the overall party share, the larger the 
variability. 
 The next step is to calculate standard deviations. Standard deviation (SD) of 
the variable is an average difference between its values and its observed mean. It 
helps to measure the level of dispersion of the variable. Higher is the standard 
devotion, more dispersed the values are. SD also helps to find the outliers. These 
are the values which lie outside the symmetric intervals (-2*SD,2*SD) and (-
3*SD,3*SD) from the mean. Finally, we produced the graph matrix with 4 columns: 
a) SD distribution; 
b) scatterplot of SD and the number of observations; 
c) scatterplot of the number of outliers and the number of observations  
(empty circles for (-2*SD,2*SD) and solid rhombi for (-3*SD,3*SD)); 
d) scatterplot of the percentage of outliers and the number of observations 
(the same). 
Again, this is done for the administrative districts, urban municipalities and electoral 
districts. The described graph matrix for Conservative party share in 2011 is shown 
on Figure 13 below: 
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Figure 13. Standard deviations and outliers for Conservative party share 
at main aggregation levels (Canada, 2011). 
 
Other graphs can be seen in Appendix 2. From what we can see on the obtained 
graphs, we can tell the following: 
 Standard deviations of voter turnout are stable throughout the years and 
they are generally smaller than for party shares, almost all of them are between 6 
and 10; 
 Standard deviation of the party shares depends the overall party share, the 
same like the ranges are; 
 Correlation between standard deviation and the number of observations is 
the same as for range statistics, so we exclude urban municipalities from the 
analysis; 
 For party shares, the amount of the outliers is the largest in the electoral 
districts, varying from 5 to 15 for an interval (-2*SD,+2*SD) and less than 5, mostly 
0, for an interval   (-3*SD,+3*SD); 
 There in an exponential dependency between the percentage of outliers and 
the number of observations. It means that when the number of observations 
increases, the amount of outliers remains stable. 
 Also if we have 3 years we could plot the percentage of outliers on a 3D 
scatterplot, where each axis stands for a year of elections. Thus, if the amount of 
outliers is stable for each territory unit, the point cloud will be oriented diagonally, 
from the coordinate zero point towards the maximum values. On Figure 14 below, 
there are such cubes for each of the main variables: 
Voter turnout Conservative   Liberal New Democratic 
    
Figure 14. 3D plots showing the amount of outliers in 2006, 2008 and 2011. 
 Voter turnout and Conservative party share clouds are oriented as described 
above, while Liberal and New Democratic party clouds have more spherical nature. 
Still, they are located around the diagonal. 
 After all, the most important conclusions are: 
 Voter turnout has a very strong normal pattern in global distribution and 
mostly in the local distribution; 
 Winning and losing parties have their own characters of distribution and 
variability. For the winning party, global distribution is close to normal, and 
variability is higher. For the party which loses the elections, global distribution is 
likely to be exponential, and variability is lower. There are intermediate stages of 
transition between these two conditions; 
 Ranges and standard deviations in the electoral districts have their own 
distribution which has some stability and can be compared with the new data or a 
model.  
3.2 Correlation between voter turnout and party shares 
One of the key points of the exploratory analysis is the regression analysis. 
As discussed in the Theoretical background chapter, some authors state that high 
correlation between the voter turnout and the winning party share points to the 
electoral fraud (Myagkov et al, 2009, Mebane and Kalinin, 2009, Klimek et al, 2012, 
Sonin, 2012). In most cases, they investigate this correlation working only with the 
entire country without breaking the data into subsets for different geographic 
regions. 
The first step to do for an overview is to build a correlation coefficient matrix 
for the entire dataset. It is shown below: 
 Voter turnout Conservative  Liberal  New Democratic 
Voter turnout 1.00000000  0.07187695 -0.02489927        -0.1067010 
Conservative       0.07187695      1.00000000 -0.22397221        -0.7158480 
Liberal -0.02489927     -0.22397221   1.00000000        -0.3356734 
New Democratic -0.10670100     -0.71584805 -0.33567338         1.0000000 
Table 1. Matrix of correlation coefficients for the main variables (Canada, 2011). 
It is obvious that correlation between different party shares is negative 
because these are the percentages from the entire amount of voters. The more 
votes one party gets, the less votes are left for the others. The brightest example is -
0.7 between Conservative and New Democratic parties. This is somewhat natural, 
and in fact, the only relationship that is less natural is the relationship between 
voter turnout and party shares. It deserves a special investigation. 
At the entire country level (without any aggregation) it is better to build a 
density scatterplot because there are too many observations for a typical 
scatterplot. We have created such scatterplots for the main parties, and in most 
cases they demonstrate the smooth bivariate distribution with a single hot spot in 
the center and the density falling towards its periphery. The only exclusion is the 
scatterplot for Conservative party share in 2011 (Figure 15a) which looks the same 
as one in Klimek et al, 2011:  
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Figure 15. Voter turnout against party shares for all  polling divisions (Canada, 2011). 
 Klimek et al state that a smaller area at the bottom stands for French Canada 
(Quebec province) and a larger area on top is for English Canada (all the rest 
Canadian provinces and territories). This assumption was checked by looking at 
province-level results which are published as well: “Looking at their results by 
province, they [Conservatives] tallied 16.5% of votes cast in Quebec but more than 
40% of votes cast in 8 of the remaining 12 other provinces.”  (Klimek et al, 2011). 
This can be enough but since we have defined the relationship between the 
provinces and polling divisions, we could visualize this on the same scatterplot. To 
do this, we are plotting semi-transparent white points above the existing graph for 
the selected provinces: Ontario (the largest English-speaking province) and Quebec: 
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Figure 16. Voter turnout against Conservative party share at polling division level  
(entire country, Canada, 2011), combined with point clouds and convex hulls  
for selected Canadian provinces. 
The plots above confirm the given statement. We can see that the areas of 
higher concentration of white points are located on respective hot spots of the 
density scatterplot. At the same time, they give more information: we can observe 
that even though the points are highly concentrated, there are the outliers which 
are very different from the main pattern. Convex hull shows the character of the 
local bivariate variance and how does it match with the global bivariate variance. 
This is a very important outcome because if we are looking for data irregularities to 
detect fraud, we should take the presence of such outliers into account. In Annex II, 
the remaining scatterplots can be found. 
Using the same method, we could build the graph for any geographic unit, 
whether it is an urban municipality or an electoral district. Of course, it is hard to 
give estimation of each graph (i.e. 308 graphs for the electoral districts). Instead, we 
did the following: 
 get correlation coefficient for each geographic unit and draw a histogram 
with their distribution, along with the plot for correlation coefficient and the 
number of observations; 
 calculate the area of the convex hull for each territory unit and divide it by 
the area of the convex hull for the entire dataset. If the ratio is closer to one, the 
variability of voter turnout and selected party share combinations is close to that 
for the entire country. On the other hand, values closer to zero mean similar 
behavior within the unit. 
 Correlation coefficients for Conservative party share and voter turnout in 
2011 look like shown below: 
a) distribution of local correlation coefficients; 
b) scatterplot of correlations coefficient and the number of observations; 
c) distribution of convex hull area ratios; 
d) scatterplot of convex hull area ratios and the number of observations. 
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Figure 17. Distribution of the correlation coefficients for voter turnout 
and Conservative party share at main aggregation levels (Canada, 2011). 
The remaining graphs are available in a digital annex. From all graphs, the outcomes 
are stated below: 
 Though the global correlation coefficient might be very small, there can be 
large local coefficients. For example, the global coefficient for Conservative party 
share in 2011 is 0.07, while the local values for the electoral districts can go above 
0.5; 
 Correlation coefficients distribution changes between years but still each 
party has its own main range where most of the coefficients fall into:  
o Conservative party: -0.1 – 0.5, 
o Liberal party: -0.3 – 0.3, 
o New Democratic party: -0.5 – 0.2; 
 Unlike variability indices, correlation coefficients for turnout and party 
shares do not follow the overall party success or failure in time; 
 As opposed to variability indices, there is no relationship between the 
correlation coefficients and the number of observations at any aggregation level. 
Least-squares equation lines on all graphs are mostly horizontal; 
 Relationship between the convex hull area ratios and the number of 
observations is very weak. It means that variability of voter turnout and party 
shares does not depend of territory population. For example, New Brunswick 
province demonstrates the most similar results within itself, while Saskatchewan 
province, having the same population, has much higher variability; 
 For the electoral districts, convex hull area ratio higher than 0.4 is extremely 
rare. This means that each electoral district has its own set of combinations of voter 
turnout and party shares but this set is always not as full as the entire country’s set; 
 We can see that convex hull area ratios follow the global party share. Better 
is the result of the elections for a party, more dispersed is the behavior within the 
territory unit, and vice versa. 
 Everything we did before was done on the aggregated data, i.e. polling 
divisions data grouped into subsets according to some geographies. The result was 
a set of indicators, like correlation coefficients, etc. At the same time, it is necessary 
to summarize data variables within to the same geographies, i.e. have 1 value for 
each territory unit. For instance, by dividing the total amount of participating voters 
by the total amount of possible electors for each unit we get the summarized voter 
turnouts. Doing the same with party shares, we can estimate their regression. An 
example of such summarization for Conservative party share at the electoral district 
level in 2011 can be seen below: 
a) distribution of summarized voter turnout values; 
b) distribution of summarized party share values; 
c) scatterplot of A against B. 
 
 Figure 18. Correlation between summarized voter turnout 
and Conservative party share (electoral districts, Canada, 2011). 
 
We can see that summarized data does not demonstrate any correlation patterns in 
any years for any variables. 
 As a conclusion, we can confirm that there is no expressed relationship 
between voter turnout and party shares. Though we observed local correlation in 
some of the territory units, the strongest pattern is the independence between the 
specified variables. Another important outcome is that the electoral districts are the 
best aggregation level for the study because they contain similar number of 
observations. When the number of observations is very different, i.e. there are very 
small and very big cities, it leads to a statistical bias in the analysis. Thus, using the 
administrative boundaries is possible for the exploratory analysis but it is not 
recommended in spatial analysis that is boundary-sensitive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.3 Electoral fraud modelling: a simulation study (I) 
 Doing the exploratory analysis, we have found a set of patterns. Our 
conclusions are valuable only if the detected patterns help to find out when the 
data is manipulated. The easiest way to check this is to model some data. In our 
case, we could change some of the results, for example by imitating the ballot 
stuffing. According to Uslegal.com dictionary, “Ballot stuffing is a type of electoral 
fraud whereby a person permitted only one vote submits multiple ballots.”. Ballot 
stuffing elevates the share of some party, as well as the voter turnout. The first 
value increases because all stuffed ballots contain votes for a single party in favor to 
which the ballot stuffing is committed, and the second one grows since each ballot 
(even the stuffed one) is accounted as an actual voter. 
 There can be several scenarios to model. For example, if Liberal party 
support had been decreasing from 2006 to 2011, we can model ballot stuffing 
process for 2011 on the basis of 2008 results. For modelling, we selected 6099 out 
of 73862 polling divisions which belong to the electoral districts where Liberal party 
was elected in 2006, but was not elected in 2008, i.e. lost the chairs. This is around 
8.25% from the total amount, so it can be a good number for performing the 
simulation. In these polling divisions, voter turnout has the normal distribution, as 
usual: 
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Figure 19. Voter turnout (a) and empty ballot count (b) in polling divisions 
where Liberal party lost its chairs in 2008. 
Turnout values mainly fall into the range between 40 and 60, and the amount of 
unused ballots is generally around 200 in each station. It looks sufficient for using 
ballot stuffing techniques without the risk of overstuffing, when the turnout comes 
close to 100%. Also, we selected only those polling districts where the number of 
empty ballots is more than 50 to avoid too clear evidence of stuffing. The number of 
stuffed ballots was calculated as a random number between 50 and 75% of the 
empty ballot count in 2008. To clarify the process, we provided is step-by-step 
example:  
 a given polling division has 300 electors and 200 voters in 2008, i.e. turnout 
66.6% and the number of empty ballots is 100; 
 between 50 and 75% (in this case, 60) extra ballots having Liberal party vote 
are going to be used in ballot stuffing in 2011; 
  in 2011, the given polling district has 310 electors (its population has slightly 
increased) and 220 voters participate (a bit more than in the last year), i.e. real 
turnout is 71% and a real number of empty ballots is equal to 90; 
 60 ballots are stuffed in the ballot box, making the turnout increase to 
(220+60)/310=90%; 
 Real share of Liberal party was 50 votes, or 22%, while after ballot stuffing it 
grew to 50+60=110, or (50+60)/(220+60)=39%.  
Full results of the modelling can be checked by using the query from a digital annex 
(3.3 - fraud simulation). As soon as we had the manipulated data, we ran the 
analysis functions that we used before. The most important changes can be 
observed in voter turnout distribution: instead of a strong normal pattern observed 
for real data, we could see a new group of observations with higher turnout both 
for global and local distributions: 
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Figure 20. Distribution of voter turnout for real and modelled data. 
 Local distributions of party shares did not reveal a significant change, the 
same for variability indices, ranges and standard deviations which changed just 
slightly. 
 Another visible change can be noticed in density scatterplots of voter 
turnout and party shares where the new hot spots appeared (highlighted by white 
circles on Figure ): 
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Figure 21. Density scatterplots for voter turnout and party shares (modelled data). 
Anomalous hot spots tell that there are many polling divisions where bivariate 
distribution of voter turnout and party share deviates from the general pattern. It is 
also clear that these anomalies are in favor to Liberal party because its hot spot is 
the highest by y axis, which means larger party shares for higher turnout values. At 
the same time, these anomalies can not be explained by the geographic context, 
like it was with the real data. When we overlay our density scatterplots with 
individual plots and convex hulls, we can not distinguish regions with predominant 
concentration of points around any of the new hot spots: 
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Figure 22. Density scatterplots for voter turnout and Conservative party share (modelled data). 
Summarized values indicate the interference as well. On the histogram of 
summarized voter turnout distribution (Figure on the left) we can see the same 
artificial spike, while the exponential distribution of party share (in the middle) is 
broken. On the scatterplot we can see that values breaking the real data patterns 
belong to the same observations, as indicated by the outlying group. 
 
Figure 23. Correlation between summarized voter turnout and Liberal  party share 
(modelled data, electoral districts, Canada, 2011). 
Finally, we can say that the exploratory analysis techniques are good at 
indicating the electoral data manipulation when it happens compactly in a set of the 
electoral districts. 
 
 
 
4 SPATIAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Spatial autocorrelation. 
 This subchapter is dedicated to discussion about the level of spatial 
autocorrelation of the electoral data. This is a critical point of the work because 
confirmed spatial autocorrelation is an evidence of data’s geographic determinance.  
 In the previous chapter we have found that there are some groups sharing 
the similar behavior in many territorial units. The next step of the analysis is to 
understand whether polling divisions belonging to these groups are geographically 
dispersed or they are located close to each other, forming groups, or clusters. As 
specified at the beginning of the work, we expect them to form groups. When 
observations with similar values form groups in space, and observations with 
different values tend to be faraway from each other, we observe spatial 
autocorrelation. There is a set of mathematical indices designed to measure the 
level of spatial autocorrelation, and Moran’s Index is one o f them. It is defined as: 
 
(1) 
where N is the number of spatial units indexed by i and j; X is the variable of 
interest; X is the mean of X; and ωij is an element of a matrix of spatial weights. The 
index varies from -1 (perfect dispersion) to 1 (perfect autocorrelation). Random 
distribution is indicated by Morans’s  I equal to 0. 
 Distribution of Moran’s indices for the electoral districts is given in a graph 
matrix with the following structure: 
a) histogram of Moran’s index values for territory units; 
b) scatterplot of Moran’s index values against the number of observations; 
c) scatterplot of Moran’s index values against the interquartile ranges of 
variable. 
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Figure 24. Moran’s Index for Conservative party share (Canada, 2011). 
As always, the remaining graphs are available in digital annex. The summary is given 
below: 
 Histograms of Moran’s I values for each variable only slightly change 
between years, demonstrating stability of geographic distribution; 
 Among the aggregation levels, the highest values are observed for the 
administrative districts. This happens because some of the administrative districts 
contain several electoral districts with very different results. Thus, we can say that 
on a higher level of geographical division variables are more determined; 
 There are no negative values, except a couple, so there is no dispersion 
pattern in the data; 
 For voter turnout in the electoral districts , Moran’s I mainly falls in a range 
between 0 and 0.15, meaning random distribution of this variable; 
 For Conservative party share in the electoral districts, Moran’s I is above 
0.15 for 50% of districts and above 0.20 for 30%. This is a good result, taking what 
we can see on Figure . On Figure a there is a map showing the spatial distribution of 
the Conservative party share at Moran’s I equal to 0.22. Lower values are 
concentrated in one area, while higher shares can be observed in the periphery. 
This likely indicates urban and rural division. On Figure b, an example of the 
electoral district having Moran’s I close to 0 can be seen. In general, such figures 
confirm the spatial determinance hypothesis; 
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Figure 25. Distribution of Conservative party share within the electoral district (Canada, 2011). 
 For Liberal and New Democratic party shares, indices are smaller (around 
30% above 0.15 and 20% above 0.20); 
 Relationship between Moran’s I and the number of observations is not 
expressed. So, more heavily populated territories can have both spatially 
determined and random voting patterns; 
 There is a strong relationship between Moran’s I and the interquartile range 
of party shares. Most of the correlation coefficients for these two values exceed 
0.30. Taking this fact, we can say that more dispersed is the variable, more spatially 
determined this dispersion is. In other words, more different are the political 
preferences in the area, more they tend to form groups in space. 
 Besides Moran’s Index which describes spatial relationship between the 
components for the entire geographic unit, there are local indicators of spatial 
association (LISA). They are designed to examine relationships between the closest 
neighbors. Each observation has its own value of LISA. For example, Local Moran’s 
index is defined as: 
                                                                                            
(2) 
where xi is the variable value, X is the mean of that variable, ωij is a spatial weight 
between neighboring observations i and j, and 
 
(3) 
with n equal to the total number of observations. Z-scores are derived using this 
formula: 
 
(4) 
Local Moran’s statistics allow indicating hot spots, cold spots and outliers in 
geographic data. Positive z-scores indicate 1.96 clusters of two types: hot spots, 
called HH (high-high) associations, where both the core and the neighbors have 
values higher than the mean value, and cold spots, named LL (low-low) associations, 
where values are lower than the mean value for all features. An observation is 
classified as HH or LL according to the difference between its value and the 
population mean. If the value is higher than the mean, it is marked as HH, and, 
logically, if the value is lower, it is marked as LL. Negative z-scores point on the 
outliers of two types: LH (low-high) and HL (high-low), where the central 
observation has a magnitude different from its neighbors. Again, the type is 
selected on the basis of the difference between its value and the population mean. 
For all cases, p-values below 0.05 are necessary to confirm the statistical 
significance of the result. 
 Since our hypothesis is that variables are spatially autocorrelated, we expect 
to see some clusters and no or a very small number of outliers. 
 Function to calculate Local Moran’s statistics is implemented in R. Its main 
parameters are a vector of values (for example, voter turnout for each polling 
division within a given electoral district) and a spatial weights list which contains 
description of spatial relationships between polling divisions. This list can be 
obtained from a spatial weights matrix which is a matrix of n rows and n columns, 
where n is the number of observations. Each cell of this matrix contains the value 
from 0 to 1 which shows the level of interaction based on the length of the common 
border. For example, if polling division A shares 50% of its boundary with polling 
division B, spatial weight of B for A is equal to 0.5. We have completed the following 
procedure for each electoral district: 
 derived the spatial weights by a stored procedure in PostgreSQL (available in 
Digital  Annex I), according to the length of common borders with first level 
neighbors, and imported them to R, along with the vector of variable values; 
 constructed and filled spatial weights matrix; 
 passed the obtained matrix and the vector of variable values to a function 
calculating Local Moran’s statistics; 
 written results back into PostgreSQL database; 
 checked results for significance; 
 prepared a set of histograms and plots. 
 We did not find any HL and LH associations at all. None of the results had a 
combination of negative z-score and p-value below 0.05. It means that there are no 
irregular spots in the data and confirms the assumptions we did before. Examples of 
significant and insignificant Local Moran statistics can be seen below: 
  
Type LL LH 
Value 12.22 26.67 
Population mean 56.41   52.62 
Neighbors 32.34 
33.74 
27.65 
37.39 
43.94 
38.03 
80.25 
62.50 
84.93 
57.06 
45.32 
55.97 
58.97 
56.57 
57.07 
Neighborhood mean 35.52 62.07 
Local Moran statistic 14.438 -4.427 
Expectation -0.004 -0.004 
Variance 0.251 0.14 
Z-score 28.793 -11.605 
p-value 0.000 1.000 
Table 2. Examples of Local Moran statistics for voter turnout (Canada, 2011). 
Even if there are no statistically significant outliers, we still have to estimate the 
number of HH and LL associations. In this case, histograms showing percentages of 
HH- and LL-classified observations are helpful. They have the following structure, 
shown on Figure : 
a) percentage of the observations having significant p-values and z-scores; 
b) percentage of the observations classified as HH associations; 
c) percentage of the observations classified as LL associations. 
 
a) b) c) 
Figure 26. Percentage of significant results of Local Moran statistics  
for Conservative party share (Canada, 2011). 
Remaining histograms are available in a digital annex. For all histograms, we can tell 
that the electoral districts have mainly between 7.5 and 22.5% of statistically 
significant results. To show what do these numbers mean in details, we can select 
an electoral district where the percentage of statistically significant results is close 
to an average (for example, 17.42% for Conservative party share in 2011). Data for 
this electoral district will be visualized with an exploratory plot showing observation 
values on x axis and neighborhood means on y axis (see Figure 27a). The scatterplot 
is divided into quarters by vertical and horizontal lines crossing the population 
mean. Thus, the upper right quarter contains observations that can possibly be 
included into HH associations because their value and the average value of their 
neighborhood is higher than the population mean, and so on for other types of local 
spatial associations. Grey points show for all polling divisions within a given 
electoral district, while statistically significant HH associations are marked with red 
color and LL groups are highlighted with blue. There are some points in the upper 
left and lower right quarters that could probably be marked as HL and LH 
associations but they are not because their p-values are lower than 0.05. 
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 27. Exploratory plot of Local Moran’s statistics for voter turnout 
(electoral district #53022, Canada, 2011). 
We can see that the orientation of the point cloud and the trendline indicate 
positive correlation between the variable value of the cores and their 
neighborhoods. So, we can observe similarity in polling divisions located close to 
each other. These are typical scatterplot and map, for other variables in other years 
and in other electoral districts this looks much the same. On Figure b, you can find 
locations of the defined HH and LL spots on the map of the electoral district. 
 In general, results obtained from Moran and Local Moran tests confirm our 
hypothesis regarding the spatial determinance of the electoral data. 
4.2 Multivariate spatial analysis. 
 The previous subchapter where we worked with Global and Local Moran 
statistics was dealing with univariate data, i.e. the investigation of a single variable. 
We studied voter turnout and each party share separately. To have a better picture, 
multivariate methods of the analysis should be used. Hierarchical clustering is one 
of such methods. If we group polling divisions into clusters, we can analyze the 
distribution of the qualitative class identifiers. To produce the clusters, we can use 
all the main variables. If the instances of the same class are located together, and 
this class is related to a certain electoral behavior, we can say that such behavior 
has concentrated nature. The amount of outliers (instances of one class surrounded 
by the instances of other classes) will let us know how random is the distribution of 
the main variables. 
An appropriate geographic level for performing the analysis can be the 
entire country, but due to computational limitations (8Gb RAM was not enough to 
work with entire Canada) we have selected province level, particularly Quebec and 
Ontario provinces. 
The first step is to find an appropriate clustering algorithm. We want to the 
clustering to reflect the patterns (there should be many classes with a large amount 
of observations), and to indicate the outliers (there should be some classes with a 
small number of instances). 
Distance-based algorithms like complete distance algorithm (see Figure 28a) 
produce very uneven structure of classes: 
  
a) b) 
 
 
c) 
Figure 28. Distribution of the observations among the clusters with urban and rural indicators for 
different clustering algorithms (Quebec, Canada, 2011). 
 We can see that there are 2 totally dominating classes, while the other 
classes are represented by too small number of instances. This algorithm could 
work great for defining the outliers but at the same time it is poor for 
demonstrating the patterns because it has just 2 dominating classes and they will 
probably form similar neighborhoods just because of their amount. 
Variance-based algorithms like Ward’s algorithm produce a quite balanced 
structure of classes (see Figure 28b). Such algorithms could work well for defining 
the patterns, while they are not helpful for defining the outliers.  
McQuitty's Similarity Analysis is an approach that produces the cluster 
structure which is good both for getting both the patterns and the outliers (see 
Figure 28c). Besides one dominating class (#1), we have several classes with a large 
number of instances (#2,#3,#5,#6 and #7) and some classes of outliers (#4,#8,#9 
and #10). 
It was expected that classification should indicate the difference between 
rural and urban areas, i.e. some classes will be completely urban and some classes 
will be completely rural, but the obtained results don’t confirm this assumption. The 
ratio between the number of rural and urban divisions in Quebec is 
14737/3458=4.26, and, as can be seen from Figure 29, this ratio is what we see for 
the main classes. The most remarkable exclusions are #6 which has significantly 
larger amount of urban divisions (ratio 1233/41=30.07) and #7 which has a larger 
amount of rural divisions than urban ones, with ratio 344/471=0.73. 
To learn the difference between the classes, we created a bar chart showing 
the average party shares and the turnout for each class: 
 
 
Figure 29. Average party shares and voter turnout for polling division classes , 
ordered by the amount of observations  (Quebec, Canada, 2011). 
 
Turnout values are displayed by semitransparent bars on top of the colored 
bars for shares. We can see that class #6 is characterized by highest support of 
Liberal party among all classes (we exclude class #8 because it has just 1 instance), 
while class #7 reflects the largest Conservative share, and many other differences. 
Combining these observations with the urban/rural structure of the classes, we can 
say that Liberal party was mostly successful in urban areas, while Conservative party 
had better results in rural areas than in urban. 
The next question is how are the classes distributed geographically. To 
answer this question, we have created a spatial view in PostgreSQL and produced a 
qualitative map based on the class identifier in QGIS. The first step here is to make 
the visual estimate of how are the instances of each class distributed in space. In 
addition to visual analysis, there should be some quantitative method to estimate 
the level of clustering for each class. We can not use the standard methods like 
Moran’s index because they deal with quantitative values, while class identifiers are 
qualitative. In this case, the neighbor analysis is the way to go. We built the list of 
first-level neighbors. Only polling divisions within the same electoral district can 
become neighbors. If two polling divisions have a common border but are located in 
different electoral districts, they are not considered as neighbors. Then we found 
the spatial weight of similar neighbors. This number is a ratio between the total 
length of the common borders with neighbors of the same class and the perimeter 
of the polling division minus the common border with polling division from other 
electoral districts. If ratio is equal to 1, all surrounding divisions have the same class, 
and we can say that the class instances are clustered. If the ratio is equal to 0, all 
surrounding divisions have different classes, indicating an outlier (see Figure 30): 
w=0.000 w=0.338 w=1.000 
   
Figure 30. Examples of polling divisions with different similarity weights. 
 
To estimate the level of clustering for all of the instances of each class, we 
built histograms showing the distribution of weights: 
 
Figure 31. Stacked histogram of the similar neighbors  weights (Quebec, Canada, 2011). 
 
Looking at this histogram, we can say the following: 
 Distribution of the similarity weights is close to normal, except two spikes at 
1 and 0 meaning clusters and outliers, respectively; 
 There are more clustered groups than the outliers; 
 At the same time, the number of outliers is very large; 
 Balance between clusters and outliers is not the same for all classes : #1, #6 
and #7 include more clusters than outliers, while #2, #3, #4 and #5 are the opposite. 
Below there are some examples illustrating the distribution which include 
the map and an individual histogram of the similarity weight distribution. Class #1 is 
the most common class, having 6771 instances. We can see that they tend to form 
groups of neighbors, like shown on Figure 32: 
 
 
Figure 32. Instances of class #1 in middle-South Quebec. 
 
 As already been said above, classes #2,  #3, #4 and #5 demonstrate less 
spatial homogeneity. An example can be seen below: 
 
Figure 33. Instances of class #3 in Montreal (Quebec, Canada, 2011). 
 
On the contrary, class #6 is represented by highly concentrated group in 
Montreal and its suburbs (Chambly, Mont-Saint-Hilaire, Vaudreuil-Dorion and 
others). 93% of its instances (1193 from 1274) are located there. On the Figure 33 
above we can see clusters of the orange polygons in that area. Class #7 forms a 
compact group in a rural area in south-east of the province (the map is available in a 
digital annex). 
The same procedure was completed also for Ontario province and for 2006 
and 2008 years for these two provinces. The outcomes are the same, with even 
more similarity than in Quebec in 2011. For example, here is the same stacked 
histogram of similar neighbors weights for Quebec in 2008: 
 
 
Figure 34. Stacked histogram of the similar neighbors weights (Quebec, Canada, 2008). 
 
The remaining graphs can be found in digital annex. After getting all the graphs and 
maps and verifying the predominant similarity of neighborhoods, it is necessary to 
perform relevant simulations to estimate the significance of the obtained results.  
There was some chance that dominating classes like class #1 tend to form similar 
neighborhoods just because they have too many instances and they eventually 
group together. The first simulation was the complete randomization of the class 
identifiers. After performing clustering with the same height as before, all class 
identifiers were shuffled within the entire province. Thus, we had the same amount 
of observations assigned to each class but they were randomly distributed in space. 
For this simulation, similar neighbor weights look like this: 
 
 
Figure 35. Stacked histogram of the similar neighbors weights  
(complete randomization of classes, Quebec, Canada, 2011). 
 
We see that the results are very different. There is a dominating peek on 0.0 value 
where all classes can be recognized. Only class#1 demonstrates some similarity, but 
from weights higher 50% are less and less popular, ending with a very slight peak at 
1.00. From the previous figures we can see that this is not the case for the real 
distribution where weights higher that 50% form a well distinguishable plateau. At 
the same time, the complete randomization is not the best way of simulation 
because it does not take the electoral district borders into account. The second way 
to go is to randomize the class identifiers by the electoral district. In this case, 
districts having mostly one class will remain almost unchanged, instead of being 
spread throughout the entire province. We expected the stacked histogram to look 
as something between the real one and a completely random one. Indeed, it looks 
like this: 
 
 
Figure 36. Stacked histogram of the similar neighbors weights  
(randomized by electoral district, Quebec, Canada, 2011). 
 
We can see that the share of similar neighborhoods has increased, but still it is  very 
far from what we observed with the real data.  
 Finally, results of multivariate analysis confirm the expected identity of 
polling divisions and their neighborhoods. 
4.3 Electoral fraud modelling: a simulation study (II) 
 In chapter 3.3, we have modelled a scenario where a political party commits 
the electoral fraud in all polling divisions of the selected electoral districts. 8% of the 
influenced observations were located in 10% of the electoral districts. Thinking 
about a proper modelling scenario to check the outcomes Chapter 4, we have to 
reject the described scenario because if we perform some manipulation on all 
observations in the electoral district, the modelled data will inherit the geographical 
pattern of the original data. Instead, we have to introduce the manipulated data 
sporadically. For example, we could randomly select from polling divisions which 
have Conservative party share less than 33% in 2008. This is 28951 out of 63416 
polling divisions. We could get 6300 polling divisions from that list to get the right 
sample size. 
 Again, distribution of voter turnout and quantity of empty ballots is normal, 
with turnout mostly between 40 and 60% and the empty ballot count mainly 
around 200. This data enables modelling of ballot stuffing. So, we extracted a data 
sample of size 6300 and performed modelling with the same conditions like the first 
scenario (50-75% from the empty ballot count in 2008 is used in ballot stuffing in 
2011), but this time for Conservative party. Density scatterplots confirm the 
interference, as for the previous scenario: 
     Conservative Liberal New Democratic 
 
Figure 37. Density scatterplots for voter turnout and party shares (modelled data). 
This confirms the conclusions already made in Chapter 3.3, and now the main 
question is how did the simulation affect the results of the spatial analysis. We can 
see that Global Moran’s Indices changed dramatically for Conservative party share 
and voter turnout. The structure of the graph matrix is as before: 
a) histogram of Moran’s index values for territory units; 
b) scatterplot of Moran’s index values against the number of observations; 
c) scatterplot of Moran’s index values against the interquartile ranges of 
variable. 
We can see how different are the values of Local Moran’s I, and how the simulation 
also affected the relationship between the index and the interquartile ranges: 
Real data 
 
 
Modelled data 
 
 
a) b) c) 
Figure 38. Global Moran’s Index for Conservative party share (Canada, 2011). 
Thus, Moran’s index looks like a sensitive measure of the interference. Less than 
10% of the observations were affected, but most of the indices shifted into a range 
between 0 and 0.1 which means spatial randomness. Local Moran’s test shows the 
same differences for voter turnout and Conservative party share, for which the 
percentage of statistically significant clusters decreased. This can be seen below: 
Real data 
 
 
Modelled data 
 
 
a) b) c) 
Figure 38. Percentage of significant results of Local Moran statistics for voter turnout (Canada, 2011). 
Looking at the exploratory plots, we can see a significantly shifted group of 
observations for voter turnout (12 in total, marked by red circle): 
Real data Modelled data 
  
Figure 39. Exploratory plots of Local Moran statistics  for voter turnout (Canada, 2011). 
They are likely the observations where we have introduced ballot stuffing. We can 
see that they have higher own values on x axis, while neighborhood means on y axis 
are the same as for most of the observations. In fact, there are 14 polling divisions 
where the data were influenced, so the graph can not detect all of them. As we see 
from the graph, significant Local Moran’s result are occasional and they do not 
reflect that outstanding group. Also, there are no statistically significant HL and LH 
associations indicated, as before. So, we can say than even if Local Moran statistics 
indicate the interference in general, it can not detect specific examples. There can 
be three possible explanations of this: 
 there are no outliers indeed (which we would like to reject because we can 
see points in LH and HL zones of the exploratory plot that have quite big difference 
between their values and neighborhood means); 
 algorithms were used for calculations (probably, poor methodology for 
calculating spatial weights matrix based only on common border lengths); 
 methodological approach (Local Moran’s I is not a suitable method for 
detection of such data). 
To check the second hypothesis, we have run Local Moran’s index tool in ArcGIS. 
We mapped voter turnout values for real and modelled data using the same color 
scheme. Then, we ran Anselin Local Moran’s I tool and overlaid identifiers of local 
spatial association types upon this map to see the changes: 
          Real data                           Modelled data 
 
Figure 40. Local Moran statistics for voter turnout (electoral districts #53022, Canada, 2011). 
First, we can clearly recognize only 14 out of 19 simulated changes by dark orange 
and red color. Some of the observations that were classified as LL and were not 
changed during the modelling process remained being LL, while some were changed 
and transformed from LL to HL and insignificant. One observation in the center, 
which was a LH-outlier, was transformed into HH after modelled ballot stuffing. This 
happened because the real value was low and the neighboring values were high, 
while after modelling the value increased (see the map on Figure 40). At the same 
time, some observations changed their class when neither their values nor the 
neighbors values had changed. But the most surprising thing was that some of the 
changed observations did not appear among significant results neither in real data 
nor in modelled data, though it is clear that their values are very different from 
neighboring values. Looks like this happens because both the observation and the 
neighbor need to have values different from population mean. In our case, only the 
value has is different, while the neighborhood is close to an average. Thus, even if 
Local Moran’s statistics help to detect the interference, like shown above, it does 
only the general estimate if the data was changed. To enable detection of specific 
observations that were manipulated, we need to look for another approach. 
Coming back to Figure 39, we can expect that comparing values and neighborhood 
means without comparing them with population mean, like Local Moran’s I does, 
could give us better results. The workflow is the next: 
 get values and neighborhood means for selected electoral district from the 
database; 
 get id list of polling divisions affected by modelling for the same district, this 
will be a model list; 
 calculate ratio between value and neighborhood mean for each observation; 
 calculate distances between these ratios; 
 get the list of observations which make up an upper decile (10-quantile) with 
largest distances, this will be a method list; 
 match the model list with the method list. 
For voter turnout in the electoral district we were looking at above, the number of 
matches was 12 – the same as the number of outstanding points on the plot. For 14 
modelled observations, this is a good number, but at the same time method list 
contained 19 observations because it was made up from 10-quantile. So, the true 
effect of the procedure is about 63% for that polling division. If we do the same for 
remaining polling divisions, we get results which detect the affected observations 
much better than Local Moran’s I did: 
 
Figure 41. Percentage of detected observations for the electoral fraud 
modelling scenario in the electoral districts (Canada, 2011). 
Thus, we can confirm that spatial analysis of geographic distribution of the electoral 
data can give valuable information regarding the electoral fraud detection. After 
modelling a real-life scenario we could reveal the places of interference by using 
statistical methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
During the analysis, we have applied a set of statistical techniques to answer 
the question about the presence of spatial patterns of the electoral data. The 
analysis provided strong evidences of large-scale regional patterns in voting 
behavior, and gave an insight about the small-scale local patterns of neighborhood 
similarity. Simulation studies confirmed significance of the obtained results. 
 The offered methods and techniques have a lot of space for improvement. 
First, the given approach should be tested on other countries and territories. 
Second, computational methods might be improved, especially for time-series data 
analysis. Third, large cities can be analyzed as sets of neighborhoods, which gives 
new aggregation levels for the study.  And finally, the next elections in Canada are 
coming in 2015, and for us it means new data which might be used as a control for 
the current results.  
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Annex 1: Data structure tables 
# Field Name Value Example 
1 Electoral District 
Number 
The number of the electoral district 10001 
2 Electoral District 
Name 
The name of the electoral district Avalon/Avalon 
3 Pol l ing Station 
Number 
The number assigned to the polling station 
 
1 
4 Pol l ing Station Name
  
A name that generally represents the locality of the polling 
division boundary 
Grates Cove 
5 [Candidate 1 name] The number of valid votes for the fi rs t candidate on the 
bal lot at this polling s tation only 
[Scott Andrews] 
45 
6 [Candidate 2 name] The number of valid votes for the second candidate on the 
bal lot at this polling s tation only 
[Matt Crowder] 
0 
7 [Candidate 3 name] The number of valid votes for the third candidate on the 
bal lot at this polling s tation only 
[Randy Wayne 
Dawe] 
0 
8 [Candidate 4 name] The number of valid votes  for the  fourth candidate on the 
bal lot at this polling s tation only 
[Matthew 
Martin Fuchs] 
10 
… … … … 
9 [Candidate n name] The number of valid votes  for the n-th (i f any) candidate on 
the ballot at this polling s tation only 
[Fabian 
Manning] 
16 
10 Rejected Ballots The number of rejected ballots at this polling s tation 0 
11 Tota l  Votes The tota l number of ballots counted at this polling station 71 
 
12 Electors  The number of electors  on the list of electors  for this 
pol ling station 
165 
 
Table 1. “pollbypol l_bureauparbureau” CSV format of General elections results data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# Field Name Value 
1 Electoral District Number Electoral district number 
2 Electoral District Name_English The English name of the electoral district 
3 Electoral District Name_French The French name of the electoral district 
4 Pol l ing Station Number The number assigned to the polling station 
5 Pol l ing Station Name A name that generally represents the locality of the polling 
division boundary 
6 Void Poll Indicator Indicates that a poll exists but has no electors 
7 No Pol l  Held Indicator Indicates that the returning officer intended to hold this poll, 
but unforeseen ci rcumstances prevented i t 
8 Merge With Indicates the number of the polling station with which the 
results of this poll were merged 
9 Rejected Ballots for Polling Station The number of rejected ballots at this polling s tation 
10 Electors for Polling Station The number of electors on the l ist of electors for this polling 
s tation 
11 Candidate’s Family Name The family name of the candidate 
12 Candidate’s Middle Name The middle name of the candidate 
13 Candidate’s First Name The fi rst name of the candidate 
14 Pol i tical Affiliation Name_English The short-form English name of the candidate’s political 
affi liation 
15 Pol i tical Affiliation Name_French The short-form French name of the candidate’s political 
affi liation 
16 Incumbent Indicator “Y” i f candidate was the incumbent, “N” otherwise 
17 Elected Candidate Indicator “Y” i f candidate was elected, “N” otherwise 
18 Candidate Poll Votes Count The number of va lid votes the candidate obtained at this 
pol ling station 
Table 2. “pollresults_resultatsbureau” CSV format of General elections results data.  
 
Since “pollresults” format contains several rows for each electoral division, it is 
better to show an example in a separate table: 
 
1 2 4 5 6 7 9 10 
10001 Avalon 1 Grates Cove N N 0 165 
10001 Avalon 1 Grates Cove N N 0 165 
10001 Avalon 1 Grates Cove N N 0 165 
10001 Avalon 1 Grates Cove N N 0 165 
10001 Avalon 1 Grates Cove N N 0 165 
11 13 14 16 17 18   
Andrews Scott Liberal Y Y 45   
Crowder Matt Green Party N N 0   
Dawe Randy Wayne Independent N N 0   
Fuchs  Matthew Martin 
NDP-New Democratic 
Party N N 10   
Manning Fabian Conservative N N 16   
Table 3. Example of “pollresults” format of General elections results data. 
 
 
# Field Name Data type Description Example 
1 ed_num integer Electoral district number 10001 
2 ed_name character 
varying(150) 
Electoral district name in English Avalon 
3 pd_num 
 
character varying(10) Pol l ing division number 1 
4 pd_name character 
varying(150) 
Pol l ing division name in English Grates Cove 
5 pd_type* character varying(3) Pol l ing division type pol  
6 pd_agg** boolean Specifies whether the polling 
division results were aggregated or 
not 
fa lse 
7 ed_incub varchar(50) Which party member was holding 
the chair by the moment of the 
elections 
Liberal 
8 ed_res varchar(50) Which party member was had the 
majori ty within the electoral 
dis trict 
Liberal 
9 pd_res varchar(50) Which party member had the 
majority within the polling division 
Liberal 
10 tota l_electors integer Total  number of people who are 
el igible to vote on the station 
165 
11 tota l_votes integer Number of people who actually 
came and voted 
71 
12 voter_turnout numeric(6,2) Ratio between the actual voters 
and total number of electors 
43.03 
13 conservative_v integer Number of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to Conservative party 
16 
14 conservative_p numeric(6,2) Percentage of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to Conservative party 
22.54 
15 l iberal_v integer Number of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to Liberal party 
45 
16 l iberal_p numeric(6,2) Percentage of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to Liberal party 
63.38 
17 new_democratic_v integer Number of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to New Democratic 
party 
10 
18 new_ democratic_p numeric(6,2) Percentage of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to New Democratic 
party 
14.08 
19 bloc_quebecois_v integer Number of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to Bloc Québécois 
nul l 
20 bloc_quebecois_p numeric(6,2) Percentage of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to Bloc Québécois 
nul l 
21 green_v integer Number of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to Green Party 
0 
22 green_p numeric(6,2) Percentage of votes for a  candidate 
who belongs to Green Party 
0.00 
23 other integer Total  number of votes for 
candidates from other parties 
0 
 Table 4. Structure of the summarized data. 
 
* If the pd_num is between 0 and 499, it is a polling division which is represented as a pol ygon in 
polling division shapefile. Such rows have 'pol' value in pd_type field. If pd_num is between 500 and 
599, this is a mobile polling station or a single building station which is represented as a point in 
ca_2011_ps dataset. Such rows have 'mob' val ue in pd_type field. If pd_num is 600 and more, it 
stands for the advanced poll which is the place were people vote a few days before elections if they 
are not able to be there at the elections day. Such rows have 'adv' value in pd_type field.  
** Some of the pd_num values include letters, l ike '1A', '1B', etc. These identifiers can not be related 
to polling districts polygons because for '1A' and '1B' there is only one polygon named '1'. To relate 
the tabular data and geographic features, we had to aggrega te results from these specific id’s. It 
means that we have inserted additional rows in the table, and this can affect the analysis results. To 
separate the aggregated and primary results, we had to add a marker field. An example of such 
aggregation can be seen below: 
 
ed_num pd_num pd_agg total_electors total_votes voter_turnout 
35045 71-1A fa lse 448 134 29.91 
35045 71-1B fa lse 328 107 32.62 
35045 71-1 true 776 241 31.06 
Table 5. An example of data aggregation. 
 
Field Name Description Example Years 
PD_ID Elections Canada unique identifier for Polling 
Divisions. 
28921 a l l 
PD_NUM Pol l ing Division number. 1 a l l 
PD_NBR_SFX Pol l ing Division suffix. 0 a l l 
PD_TYPE Type of the Polling Division. Value is “N” for Normal. N a l l 
ADV_POLL Number of the Advance Poll the Polling Division refers 
to. 
600 a l l 
FED_ID Elections Canada unique identifier for the electoral 
dis trict. 
1180 2011 only 
FED_NUM Electoral district number. 10001 a l l 
A_UPDT_DTE Date s tamp of the last attribute modification. 2006-12-01 2011 only 
G_UPDT_DTE Date s tamp of the last geometric modification. 2003-05-29 2011 only 
EMRP_NAME Concatenation of PD_NUM, “-“ and PD_NBR_SFX. 1 2006 missing 
POLL_NAME Pol l ing Division name. Grates Cove 2011 only 
PN_UPDT_DT Date s tamp of the last Polling Division name 
modification. 
nul l 2011 only 
AD_UPDT_DT Date s tamp of the last Advance Polling District 
modification. 
nul l 2011 only 
URBAN_RURA Urban–Rural indicator. R 2011 only 
Table 6. The attribute structure of polling  division data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Field Name Description Example 
AGG_LEVEL Terri tory unit type: 
1 - province 
2 - administrative district 
3 - ci ty 
4 - electoral district 
1 
UNIT_ID Terri tory unit ID 11 
UNIT_NAME Terri tory unit name Quebec 
ED_ID Electoral district ID 24009 
PD_NUM Pol l ing Division ID 19 
Table 7. Geographic relations table structure. 
 
 
  
Annex 2: An example of R function 
 Most of R functions created for this work have the same structure. To give 
readers a chance to look how they work in general, one function is attached. 
Complete set of functions is available in a digital annex on a DVD. 
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
#     #import necessary libraries and set database connection #     # 
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
 
library(DBI) 
library(RPostgreSQL) 
drv<-dbDriver("PostgreSQL") 
con<-dbConnect(drv, dbname="Thesis", user="postgres") 
 
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
#     #range and interquartile range distribution #     # 
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
 
rgs<-function(var,year) { #function for calculating ranges 
 
#the function builds histograms for simple range 
#and interquartile range at several aggregation levels, 
#as well as their scatterplots against the number of observations 
 
#"var" specifies the short name of the variable 
#and selects the correspondent column IDs 
 
if (var=="turn") { 
var.name<-"Turnout" #full name used for graph labeling  
var.col<-8     #column id of values column 
     #in ca_year.getdata() stored procedure 
} else if (var=="con") { 
var.name<-"Conservative party share" 
var.col<-9 
} else if (var=="lib") { 
var.name<-"Liberal party share" 
var.col<-10 
} else if (var=="dem") { 
var.name<-"New Democratic party share" 
var.col<-11 
} else { 
stop("Incorrect 'variable' option. The first parameter should be 'con', 
'lib' or 'dem'.") 
} 
 
#"year" is the year of elections and it is directly used 
#in the database query strings and graph label strings 
 
if (year%in%c(2006,2008,2011)) { 
rs1<-dbGetQuery(con,paste("select * from ca_",year,".var(1)",sep="")) 
rs2<-dbGetQuery(con,paste("select * from ca_",year,".var(2)",sep="")) 
rs3<-dbGetQuery(con,paste("select * from ca_",year,".var(3)",sep="")) 
rs4<-dbGetQuery(con,paste("select * from ca_",year,".var(4)",sep="")) 
} else { 
stop("Incorrect 'year' option. The second parameter should be '2006', '2008' 
or '2011'.") 
} 
 
 
 
#prepare a list of datasets, their names 
#and vertical ranges for their plots 
 
rs_list<-list(rs2,rs3,rs4) 
rs_namelist<-c("Administrative districts","Urban municipalities","Electoral 
districts") 
rs_ylims<-c(120,75,150,35,25,50) 
 
#open writing session for the graph matrix file and create a canvas 
filename<-paste("D:/graphics/ranges/",var,"_ranges_",year,".png",sep="") 
png(filename, units="in", width=28, height=21, res=300) 
par(mfrow=c(3,4)) 
 
#get data for building the graphs 
 
rs.id=2 
for(rs in rs_list) { #aggregation level loop 
 
 res.mat<-matrix(ncol=4,nrow=0) #results matrix 
 colnames(res.mat)<-c("Unit_name","N_obs","Range","IQR") 
 
 #go through each territory unit and get the variable vector 
 
 for(i in 1:nrow(rs)) { #territory unit loop 
 
  unit.id<-rs[i,1] 
  unit.name<-rs[i,2] 
 
  #this is a fix for names containing apostrophe symbol 
  if (length(grep("'",unit.name))==0) {  
    
   #get values 
   unit.values<-dbGetQuery(con,paste("select * from  
    ca_",year,".getdata(",rs.id,",'",unit.name,"') 
    where unit_id=",unit.id,";",sep="")) 
   unit.values<-unit.values[,var.col] 
   unit.values<-na.omit(unit.values) 
   unit.count<-length(unit.values) 
 
   #filter units having between 15 and 350 divisions 
   if (unit.count>15&unit.count<350) {  
     
    #calculate ranges (or whatever needed) 
    unit.r<-max(unit.values)-min(unit.values) 
    unit.iqr<-IQR(unit.values, na.rm=TRUE, type=7) 
 
    #append results to results matrix 
    res.mat<-rbind(res.mat, 
     c(unit.name, unit.count, unit.r, unit.iqr) 
     ) 
          
    } #end if 
    
   } #end if 
 
  } #end territory unit loop 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 #build graphs from the obtained results matrix 
   
 #histogram of simple range 
 hist(as.numeric(res.mat[,3]), col="blue" 
  ,ylim=c(0,rs_ylims[rs.id+2]), breaks=5*(0:20) 
  ,cex.main=2.8, cex.axis=2, cex.lab=2 
  ,xlab=paste(var.name,"range"), ylab="Frequency"  
   ,main=rs_namelist[rs.id-1] 
  ) 
 
 #scatterplot of simple range vs. amount of observations 
 plot(as.numeric(res.mat[,2])~as.numeric(res.mat[,3]), pch=18 
  ,cex=2, cex.main=2.8, cex.axis=2, cex.lab=2 
  ,xlim=c(0,100), ylim=c(0,350) 
  ,xlab=paste(var.name,"range"),ylab="Number of observations" 
  ,main="" 
  ) 
 out<-lm(as.numeric(res.mat[,2])~as.numeric(res.mat[,3])) 
 abline(out) 
 
 #histogram of the IQR 
 hist(as.numeric(res.mat[,4]), col="blue" 
  ,breaks=5*(0:20), ylim=c(0,rs_ylims[rs.id-1]) 
  ,cex.main=2.8, cex.axis=2, cex.lab=2 
  ,xlab=paste(var.name,"IQR"),ylab="Frequency",main="" 
  ) 
 
 #scatterplot of IQR vs. amount of observations 
 plot(as.numeric(res.mat[,2])~as.numeric(res.mat[,4]), pch=18 
  ,cex=2, cex.main=2.8, cex.axis=2, cex.lab=2 
  ,xlim=c(0,30), ylim=c(0,350) 
  ,xlab=paste(var.name,"IQR") 
  ,ylab="Number of observations", main="" 
  ) 
 out<-lm(as.numeric(res.mat[,2])~as.numeric(res.mat[,4])) 
 abline(out) 
 
 rs.id<-rs.id+1 
 
 } #end aggregation level loop 
 
#close the file writing session 
dev.off() 
 
} #end function rgs 
 
#execution example 
rgs("con",2011) 
 
#prepare the variable space for "rgs" function 
vars<-c("turn","con","dem","lib") 
years<-c(2006,2008,2011) 
 
#execute "rgs" function with all combinations of variables 
for (v in 1:length(vars)){ 
 for (y in 1:length(years)){ 
  rgs(vars[v],years[y]) 
 } 
} 
